Is the fuse mechanism to use feasible in the digital currency market?

The starting point of the fuse mechanism is good, can protect the interests of small investors on digital currency markets to prevent them suffer greater losses. However, the fuse mechanism is difficult to implement in digital currency market. First, the digital currency fluctuations in the market is very large, a problem set is blown points. We need to understand that the current fuse mechanism in the traditional financial markets have repeatedly changed the rules, the purpose of fusing system designers did so, in fact, do not want to blow occurs because the fuse will prevent market trading, disrupting normal market behavior. With stocks, for example, the S & P fell three percentage trigger fuse were: 7%, 13% and 20%. The first tranche of 7%, in operation since twenty years, it happened twice fuse, but for digital currency market? According to last year's statistics do, the median average daily Quote change Bitcoin is 12%, which means that if we set a 7% blow point, then the normal trading Bitcoin will be interrupted several times, which is the market It is unfavorable. Secondly, the digital currency market is a 7 * 24h market and digital currency transactions on multiple platforms, so when one trading platform to announce measures taken fuse, if the fuse occurs, the digital currency will be spread across platforms increase, triggering arbitrage, eventually fuse mechanism irrelevance; for example a fuse mechanism Stock Exchange announced the introduction of Bitcoin, Bitcoin fell one day, the exchange a trigger fuse, Bitcoin price stays at $ 9000, but other exchanges Bitcoin price has dropped to $ 8,000, which formed the arbitrage space. A recovery but the exchange reopened from the fuse, the Bitcoin price on its platform in the role of arbitrage mechanism will continue to fall to $ 8,000, fuse mechanism simply useless. So, if all of the major exchanges or exchange industry consensus, uniform application of the fuse mechanism work? Of course not feasible, because such an alliance similar to the cartel (OPEC is a cartel), such an alliance does not have the innate stability: members of the alliance have a motive to deceive, in game theory this is a typical the "prisoner's dilemma": when the fuse occurs, if some exchanges within the Union secretly traded, it will bring great benefits to their market share in the market and income, which will encourage members are secretly trading, final forming a Nash equilibrium, exchanges are in private transactions or withdraw fuse mechanism, fuse mechanism alliance also exist in name only. The event also includes oil fell a kind of "prisoner's dilemma", Saudi Arabia urged Russia to cut production, Russia does not want to reduce their market share and revenue, does not agree; the breakdown of negotiations Saudi Arabia to increase production, resulting in crude oil prices are now cheaper than the price of mineral water; in fact, if double cut comply with the agreement, then the situation is now stronger than the two parties. Editor: ct